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Preface
In March 2011 the Independent Public Service Pensions Commission (IPSPC), 
chaired by Lord Hutton, published a landmark report on local government 
pension schemes. It found that key data concerning assumptions were 
incomplete and inconsistent, which makes it impossible to analyse their true 
current financial position or their future prospects.1 It also found that there was 
no clear and consistent standard for investment governance in the schemes. 
In the light of these findings, Hutton called for a clear definition of investment 
governance to be established and for a full benchmarking study to be carried 
out in order to identify and clarify the perceived problems, and to recommend 
improvements that would help schemes reduce their costs and, therefore, the 
current and future burden on the taxpayer.
Hutton’s proposals coincided with the growing interest in – and also opposition 
to – the idea of a central collective or mutual fund for the London schemes, 
which, in aggregate, are in a significantly worse funding position than defined 
benefit (DB) schemes in the private sector. London borough funds each have 
assets under management of less than £1bn, with 50% of funds holding less than 
£0.5bn and 50% in the £0.5-1bn category. (The London Pension Fund Authority 
is an exception with £4.3bn of assets in 2012). The concept of the central fund 
emerged from concerns over the inefficiencies associated with small funds and 
was based largely on a quantitative analysis of the cost savings that might be 
achieved through the reduced fees and improved asset management strategies 
conferred by greater scale.2
While Hutton’s recommendations and the central fund proposal appear to form 
part of the same debate, it is not a given that the latter would address the problems 
identified by the former. We suggest, therefore, that a full and open debate on the 
need for reform, and what the reform options might be, should not considered 
without first conducting further analysis that is qualitative as well as quantitative. 
Such analysis would interrogate the data in close detail. Despite the statements 
about the lack of data in previous reports, such as those published publicly by 
Hutton and privately by PwC, the Pensions Institute has found that almost all of 
the data are available and that a close analysis can complete the missing pieces 
in the jigsaw. However, to retrieve and evaluate all data across all schemes will 
require a major investigative and forensic study that includes the examination of 
a range of documents – some of which appear to be under-researched or not 
researched at all at present – plus a robust quantitative modelling exercise so 
that it is possible to compare like with like. 
The analysis would also consider very carefully the governance frameworks, 
decision-making processes, the strategies, and – importantly – the behavioural 
issues that help to explain the schemes’ current funding positions and future 
plans to address deficits. To date, this essential qualitative analysis has been 
missing from the debate. 
1 http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/hutton_final_100311.pdf. Hereafter referred to in the text as ‘the 
Hutton report’ or ‘Hutton’.
2 The analysis by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was not published in the public domain.
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The focus of this present report, therefore, is the administering authority’s 
pension committees, which run the local government schemes. This focus 
provides a better understanding how and why key pension fund administration 
decisions are reached and diverse actuarial and investment assumptions are 
adopted.  
The purpose of the research exercise that we conducted was to identify areas that 
might be considered in a full benchmarking study of the investment governance 
of the 34 London Local Government Pension Schemes (LGPSs).
The preliminary results of this research, set out in this present report, indicated that 
in certain cases the decision-makers are influenced as much – and possibly more 
– by behavioural and political factors than by the current investment governance 
framework, which our research indicates can be poor. One possible conclusion 
from our research, therefore, is that there might be a connection between poor 
investment governance and the increasing trend for schemes to defer the costs 
of their liabilities into the future (‘kicking the can down the road’, as it were) – a 
concern that was also raised by Hutton and the Centre for Policy Studies.3
Our analysis was based on information publicly available on the schemes’ 
websites, from which we were able to derive the core data on funds’ key financial 
and actuarial assumptions and the context in which these are determined. This 
enabled us to consider, among other aspects, the nominal discount rates relative 
to the funding position and the recovery period. 
We also examined the minutes of the pension committee meetings, a close 
scrutiny of which reveals how decisions are made in practice, for example, 
through an assessment of the quality of debate between decision-makers and 
their advisers and asset managers, and the apparent ability (or otherwise) of 
decision-makers to challenge the information with which they are presented. 
This research was supplemented by a wide range of interviews with councillor-
members of the pension committee and with the administering authorities’ (the 
individual council’s) officers involved in running the scheme – the senior treasury 
and investment staff. The interviews represent a broad cross-section of London 
funds, notwithstanding the fact that certain funds were unwilling to discuss their 
governance framework and procedures with us. We also interviewed independent 
experts in the private sector with experience of local government schemes. These 
interviews are anonymised for confidentiality reasons.
As the evidence in our report reveals, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that 
the London LPGSs in aggregate represent a ticking time-bomb – however 
well managed some of the individual schemes might be. The extent to which 
the liabilities in the schemes are being understated and the recovery periods 
continually extended into the future will sooner or later become transparent. 
While individual schemes could improve their governance, ultimately the 
responsibility for introducing a robust governance framework for all of the funds 
lies with the regulator – the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG). There is time to diffuse the time-bomb – but time is running out and 
action is required urgently. 
3 Centre for Policy Studies, August 2012: http://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/
original/111027141410-20110211EconomySelfSufficiencyIsTheKey.pdf 
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Based on the research, we make three proposals for future research. First, we set 
out recommendations that would improve the clarity and comparability of key 
data; second, we recommend the London schemes establish a clear definition 
of investment governance; and third, we put forward a proposal for a full 
qualitative and quantitative benchmarking survey of the 34 schemes. Importantly, 
this further research, should it be undertaken, would not be dependent on the 
cooperation and active participation of all 34 schemes. Our investigations to 
date indicate that this would not be a realistic prospect, since many schemes are 
sensitive to what might be perceived as an invasive level of scrutiny.
Many people helped with this research. We would like to thank in particular: 
Chris Wagstaff, Visiting Fellow of the Pensions Institute, Trustee Director and 
Investment Committee Member, Aviva Staff Pension Scheme, and Independent 
Trustee Director and Investment Committee Chair, Merchant Navy Ratings 
Pension Fund; Luke Webster, Treasury Manager, Greater London Authority and  
a former borough pension fund officer.
The idea for this report followed a debate entitled ‘Merging London’s Pension 
Funds: The Pros and Cons’ organised by Centre for London and held at City  
Hall on 2 July 2012. The Pensions Institute participated in the debate which  
was also attended by the London Pension Fund Authority (LPFA). We suggested 
to the LPFA that it might broaden the debate if there was an independent  review 
of the current state of investment governance in London LGPSs. The LPFA agreed 
such a review would be worthwhile and funded the research. This report is the 
outcome. The LPFA did not seek to influence our research in any way.  The views 
expressed here are those of the authors not the Pensions Institute which takes no 
policy positions.
David Blake and Debbie Harrison, November 2012
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Executive summary 
The purpose of this discussion paper is to establish whether there is a 
fundamental problem in respect of the investment governance of London Local 
Government Pension Schemes (LGPSs). Our evidence indicates that, in aggregate 
across the schemes as a whole, this is indeed the case. The paper suggests 
further research is required before appropriate recommendations can be made.
We stress that our research found examples of strong investment governance 
and excellent administration. However, it also identified serious weaknesses in 
the case of a large number of schemes. It is on the latter that we focus – with 
reference to the former, and also with reference to best practice in the private 
sector, in order to identify areas for improvement.
Above all, the paper indicates that the LGPSs have suffered from the lack of 
a strong overarching governance framework and supervision, which is the 
responsibility of the regulator – the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG).
We highlight the following problems in particular.
1. Poor and inconsistent data
  a. The reporting of key data by schemes – the nominal discount rate, 
investment performance assumption, and recovery periods, for example –  
is often poor and inconsistent. 
  b. In many cases there is no published assumption for the scheme’s overall 
investment performance target. In these cases the focus appears to be on the 
performance of individual asset managers, rather than on an overarching 
investment strategy.
  c. The data, if provided, often are not explained clearly or thoroughly. 
  d. The data are frequently buried towards the end of lengthy reports that 
are largely devoted to generic descriptions of the economic and financial 
environment, manager performance and accounting audits. 
  e. There is a marked difference between the level of scrutiny applied to 
accounting and to actuarial factors: the former is extensive and specific,  
while the latter frequently is generic and vague.
2  schemes do not make relevant connections between investment 
governance, poor performance and the deferment of liabilities
  a. Councillors dominate pension committee decisions. While evidently highly 
diligent in exercising their responsibilities, their ability to develop experience 
and expertise appears to be limited because their tenure is predicated on 
four-yearly elections. We found examples where the entire pension committee 
membership had changed at the last election.
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  b. The combination of the use of favourable discount rates and investment 
assumptions, together with repeated extensions of funding recovery plans, 
indicate that a number of schemes would appear to be deferring the cost of 
liabilities into the future. 
  c. There appears to be evidence that some schemes – through their choice 
of actuarial or investment consultant – ‘shop around’ for discount rates and 
investment performance assumptions to improve the funding level. 
  d. Schemes’ reports and, in particular, the minutes of quarterly pension 
committee meetings, indicate the actuarial and investment consultant 
(frequently the same firm) drive the decision-making process and that their 
advice is not challenged effectively. This suggests a possible over-reliance on 
these consultants.
  e. Investment strategy can be poor. There is a disproportionate focus on micro 
issues, such as asset manager selection, at the expense of the key macro 
focus, which is the overarching investment objective and strategy. This results 
in frequent changes of manager, which leads to substantial additional costs 
in terms of selection procedures, transition management and investment 
performance. There is also a strong preference for active managers over 
passive and for significant allocations to alternative asset classes that appear 
to be excessive relative to the scheme’s size, both of which features add to the 
administration costs, but without any evident corresponding reward. 
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Proposals for further research
We hope that this report will stimulate debate and suggest that after a period of 
consultation with stakeholders, further research is undertaken. We propose the 
following areas for consideration.
1. to establish a blueprint for the calculation and explicit presentation of 
clear and consistent data 
This would be in the form of a simple tabulated summary at the beginning of 
each annual report which might include the following data for the current and 
previous two valuations:
•	 The	size	of	the	fund	and	the	size	of	the	deficit
•	 The	funding	position
•	 The	recovery	period
•	 The	actuarial	assumptions	
 ° Nominal discount rate
 °  Investment performance target (contingent on the deficit recovery period 
and the expected growth of liabilities) 
 ° Inflation (earnings and price)
 ° Mortality
•	 The	employer	contribution
•	 The	proportion	of	council	tax	receipts	used	for	scheme	funding	purposes
Each data item should be expressed on an agreed single standardised basis, so 
that comparisons can be made across the London schemes and also with non-
London LGPSs and with private sector DB schemes. 
2. to establish a clear definition of investment governance for the london 
schemes
3. Based on the data blueprint and the definition of investment governance, 
to conduct a full benchmarking study of the 34 funds to produce a ‘map’ of 
governance standards across all the schemes
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section 1:  
objective of the study And information sources used
Transparency and effective oversight of public service schemes is required for public 
service workers and taxpayers to have confidence in the system and improve the 
quality of debate about the future of public service pensions. Currently there is 
inconsistency in what scheme data and assessments, such as valuations, are published 
and such information is often difficult to access. This lack of transparency prevents 
comparisons and hinders analysis. hutton 9
The objective of the study was to assess the quality of investment governance in 
London Local Government Pension Schemes. This, in turn, required us to assess 
the quality of the information available to those engaged in the investment 
governance process.
To do this, we analysed available documentation and conducted a series of 
interviews that together help explain how schemes are run. The key documents 
we used are those publicly available on each local authority’s website. 
We accessed the following specific documents:
•	 Core	documents:
 ° The Annual Report and Accounts
 ° The Triennial Valuation (31 March 2010)
 ° Statement of Investment Principles (SIP)
 ° The Funding Strategy Statement (FSS)4 
 ° The Statement of Accounts 
•	 Additional	documents,	where	available:
 ° The Governance Report
 ° The Business Plan
 ° Committee Meeting Reports
Some funds publish the core documents separately, while others combine them  
in a single annual report and accounts document, which includes the SIP, FSS  
and Statement of Accounts at the end. The quality and number of documents 
varies across different local authorities. Only certain reports and certain 
information are legally required to be made public and it is not clear what 
minimum standards are required for the extent of disclosure and the depth of 
analysis and explanation required for scheme-specific data. Future research 
would clarify this point.
We found that the pension committee meeting reports, which several funds 
publish on a quarterly basis, provide a very useful insight into the way that these 
4 This document follows CIPFA guidelines set out in ‘Guidance on Preparing and Maintaining a 
Funding Strategy Statement and to the Fund’s Statement of Investment Principles’. For a comparison 
with private sector guidelines, see http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/doc-library/scheme-
funding-recovery-plans-of-uk-defined-benefit-and-hybrid-schemes.aspx
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meetings work and how decisions are reached.  Future research would undertake 
a more thorough analysis of these sources of information.
A note on the availability and quality of data 
The biggest challenge facing researchers is the absence of a central, publicly 
available, depository of information to enable comparisons between the London 
schemes – a service for which there is a pressing need, as recommended in the 
Hutton report:
Recommendation 21: Centrally collated comprehensive data, covering all LGPS 
Funds, should be published including Fund comparisons, which, for example, clarify 
and compare key assumptions about investment growth and differences in deficit 
recovery plans. hutton 17
At present, it is necessary to access 34 different websites. Some have a specific 
home page for the pension fund, but others scatter information across the local 
authority’s general website.
Overall, the ease of access to information in the core documents varied 
considerably, with actuarial descriptions and data frequently relegated to the 
final third of a very lengthy document. Compared with the extensive coverage of 
accounting, the investment conditions, and the performance of asset managers 
– the actuarial information provided was very limited and often quite vague. 
The most difficult data to identify were the actuarial assumptions (in particular 
the nominal discount rate (NDR) for the valuation as at 31 March 2010 and the 
corresponding rate for the previous valuation period (2007)) and the investment 
performance assumption which, in most cases, was missing.
The NDR used can under- or over-state the funding position, as the Audit 
Commission (2010)5 pointed out and which also stated that the use of 
inappropriately favourable assumptions would not solve the underlying issues 
but merely defer the liabilities into the future. We examined the NDRs set out 
in the 2010 valuations and also examined the 2007 figures (where available): 
the 2010 NDRs, as expected, were generally lower than the 2007 NDRs as a 
consequence of the government’s ‘quantitative easing’ exercise following the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2008 which lowered the yields on bonds upon which 
the NDRs are based. Future researchers would have access to the March 2013 
valuations,6 which would enable them to establish clearly the trend in NDRs 
since the GFC and to evaluate the extent to which what Hutton described as ‘an 
established or developing trend to defer unfunded liabilities into the future’ is an 
embedded feature of the London LGPSs.
The Audit Commission made an initial examination of the sustainability of the 
LGPS in its July 2010 information paper, ‘Local government pensions in England’ 
and took the view that the current approach, with unfunded liabilities being deferred 
into the future, could not continue indefinitely. Following the planned abolition of the 
Audit Commission, it will be necessary for another body to follow up this conclusion. 
hutton 136
5 http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/nationalstudies/localgov/localgovpensions/Pages/Default.aspx
6 Although we understand that these reports might not be published until 2014.
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The analysis of three valuation periods in the post-2000 economic and 
financial environment would also facilitate a more detailed analysis of the cost 
implications of recovering deficits over a period longer than a standard valuation 
interval. Certainly, there is clear evidence from our research that this is already 
happening, with several funds resetting their recovery plan periods in 2010 to 25 
years, which was the maximum permitted (we understand this has been reduced 
to 24 years, although one fund appears to be using a 30 year period). Hutton 
stressed this ‘would be a measure of how far future generations are facing 
greater burdens because of decisions to trade off the short term against the long 
term’ (139).
There is no information in the fund documents about the proportion of council 
tax used to fund any scheme deficit, which we suggest should be made available 
as this is in the public’s interest. A report published in January 2006 suggested 
that for all LGPSs the figure at the time was about 26%.7
7 www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2930601/Whose-pension-are-you-paying.html. This report  
was also covered in ‘Whose Pension are you Paying?’ shown on Channel 4, 27 January 2006.
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section 2: Qualitative Analysis
We began our qualitative analysis with a brief consideration of the overarching 
regulatory framework for Local Government Pension Schemes (LGPSs) and then 
focussed on how governance works in practice through a close examination of 
the composition, collective experience, expertise, knowledge and resources of 
the local authority’s pension committee, the body responsible for investment 
decisions. This approach provided a practical and, we hope, fresh insight into  
the potential weaknesses of investment governance. 
2.1 The regulatory framework for Local Government Pension Schemes 8
LGPSs were established on a statutory basis, rather than on the trust basis used in 
the private sector for defined benefit (DB) pension schemes. We understand that 
this implies that their fiduciary duty, in relation to the assets, is to council taxpayers, 
rather than to the scheme members and other beneficiaries, which is the model that 
applies in the private sector. There is no employer covenant in the public sector, as 
there is in the private sector: ultimately the taxpayer underwrites the scheme.
The Regulator is the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG). The Secretary of State for the DCLG is the supervisor and is responsible 
for setting out the responsibilities of the administering authorities and also for 
approving the appointment of pension committee members, with the exception 
of the LPFA, which has its own procedure for appointments. The Policy Review 
Group for England and Wales, run by the DCLG, is responsible for considering 
changes to rules. 
Each scheme is run locally by the administering authority through the pension 
committee (or panel), which must comply with national law, but which also 
has certain discretions in relation to investment governance. In line with DCLG 
guidance, each scheme should have an investment strategy that is based on 
the deficit recovery period and the expected growth of liabilities and how these 
liabilities are to be met, in terms of investments selected and ‘reasonable risk 
parameters’. This is balanced against other aims, such as seeking to keep 
employer contribution levels stable and affordable, and taking account of the 
impact on local council tax payers.
Participating employers to the schemes include a very variable range of non-
local-government private sector employers, a feature that adds a further layer  
of complexity.
2.2 Potential weaknesses in the regulatory framework
While schemes are required to report certain information to the DCLG, it is not 
clear the extent to which the Department operates as a regulator, in the sense 
that is understood in the private sector, where several government departments 
are involved (in particular the Department for Work and Pensions and the 
Treasury), and where the day-to-day job of independent regulation and scrutiny 
is undertaken by the Pensions Regulator (tPR).
8 http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/nationalstudies/localgov/localgovpensions/Pages/Default.
aspx 
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The Hutton report commented on this issue as follows:
There is a case for scrutiny of public service pension schemes that is independent of 
stakeholders with a direct interest, such as employers, local councillors and ministers 
…While some local authorities consider the DCLG as their pension regulator, this 
does not seem appropriate given that best practice advocates the separation of powers 
… as they have no oversight of pension administration or the management of pension 
funds in the administering authorities. hutton 134
As noted above, the DCLG guidance requires schemes to publish an investment 
strategy that sets out how its pension liabilities are to be met, but in practice we 
found this area of reporting to be poor in most cases, with schemes providing 
only a very generic overview of investment issues. 
The DCLG guidance requires the investment strategy in LGPSs to take account of 
the need to keep employer contributions ‘stable and affordable’. The sponsoring 
employers of private sector DB schemes also desire ‘stable and affordable’ 
contributions. But there is a fundamental difference in the position of the two 
groups of employers. In the public sector, the council taxpayer provides the 
ultimate covenant, and the sponsoring employer of a LGPS can pass the burden 
for underfunding onto the council tax payer. In the private sector, the covenant is 
underwritten by the employer which must provide any additional funding to the 
pension scheme to enable it to meet its recovery plan. Although this obligation 
could force the private sector company into liquidation and the scheme into the 
Pension Protection Fund, this escape route is not open to council taxpayers.
The Hutton report commented on these points as follows:
The LGPS Funds are given far more scope to exercise flexibility over their approach 
to funding than trust-based schemes, where the regulatory regime accepts that funding 
should be scheme-specific, but triggers firm criteria for funding adequacy and ensures 
that schemes take appropriate action. hutton 138
As we explain below, there is an additional behavioural factor at work in the 
public sector, since understandably councillor members of the pension committee 
might be keen to avoid resources being directed to the fund that might otherwise 
be spent on the local projects to which they committed themselves when they 
were elected.
Finally, although scheme assets are ring-fenced, with the exception of fees to 
external professionals, many of the overheads are ‘implicit’ costs and are not 
explicitly accounted for. We understand that this is because the scheme is not a 
separate legal entity and therefore it shares common resources with the local 
authority. These overheads appear to include the authority’s IT resources and the 
time allocated to running the fund by its officers, such as the chief finance officer 
and treasurer.9 Further investigation might determine the extent to which cross-
subsidies apply. 
9 See Treasury ‘Scrutiny Unit Briefing  Note: Public Sector Pensions’, May 2007.  
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/publicsectorpensions.pdf
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2.3 The pension committee and supporting resources
In the private sector, the governance of the pension scheme is established 
by a trustee board that comprises employers, lay members, and, possibly, a 
union representative. Increasingly, especially in the larger schemes, there is an 
independent trustee and a CIO.10 
The equivalent of the trustee board in local authority schemes is the pension 
committee. While there are similarities between the private sector trustee board 
and the local authority pension committee, there are important differences too.  
To explore these differences, we drew on the documentation publicly available on 
the authorities’ websites and gained further insight from a series of confidential 
interviews with councillor members of the committee, the authorities’ financial 
executives who are involved in the running of the pension scheme, and also with 
several independent experts who had direct experience of advising the London 
schemes.
number and type of members and their voting rights
Most committees had between four and 12 members, with an average of 
about six or seven. In some cases, in particular in the smaller schemes, the 
committee comprised only of councillors. In others, the committee included a 
union representative, a member representative and a representative from a 
participating employer. However, we did not see any examples within this second 
group where the member had voting rights.
Several committees had more extensive committee memberships – more than 20 
members in a minority of cases – and these included the financial advisers to the 
fund and also the authority’s professional senior financial officers, such as the 
director of finance, the head of the treasury function and the chief accountant. 
(As previously noted, in most cases the officers attend meetings but are not 
formal members.) In addition, some schemes have appointed an independent 
adviser, but this individual does not appear to have voting rights.
the chair
This is always a councillor.
the chief finance officer11 
The CFO is referred to as the S151 Officer, with reference to Section 1:51 of the 
Local Government and Housing Act 1979. We use this description here.
We understand that the S151 Officer is considered to be the most important 
individual in relation to investment governance and has the ultimate power of 
10 There has also been a marked trend, particular among smaller and medium-sized schemes that 
cannot afford a full-time CIO, towards appointing some type of fiduciary manager to undertake the 
more regular hands-on investment strategy and asset management functions. Aon Hewitt, Delegated 
Investment Survey 2012, http://www.aon.com/unitedkingdom/fiduciary-management/delegated_
investment_survey.jsp 
11 The CFO is also known as the Executive Director of Resources or, less usually these days, the 
Borough Treasurer.
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approval or veto for the authority’s financial decisions, including those of the 
pension fund in relation to the manager appointments and the fees, for example. 
He or she, therefore, is the most powerful figure involved in the administration 
of the fund and also is legally responsible for the prudent management of the 
authority’s financial affairs. 
Moreover, this is a professional appointment, so the individual is not a 
councillor. Therefore the S151 Officer theoretically is politically neutral. However, 
interviewees said that the individual operates within a political environment and 
ultimately is hired – and can be fired – by the councillors.
In practice, the extent to which the S151 Officer is involved directly in the 
committee’s work varies considerably. Some are very ‘hands-on’ and retain 
direct responsibility for a range of functions. Others might delegate these to, for 
example:
•	 The	CIO	or	investment	director
•	 The	pension	scheme	accountant
•	 The	authority’s	treasury	manager	
the treasury manager
This is likely to be a senior employee of the authority, who is often responsible for 
the scheme’s accounting and who might also undertake some of the functions of 
the chief finance officer, as noted above.
the chief investment officer (cio)
A very small minority of the larger schemes have appointed a professional CIO. 
This is considered an important role, as he or she can address governance issues 
swiftly, rather than wait for the next quarterly meeting. However, as in the private 
sector, a full-time CIO is not an economic option for smaller schemes, which 
would be unable to afford and to justify such an appointment. The fact that each 
of the London LGPSs have assets under management of less than £1bn – and in 
50% of cases less than £0.5bn – is clearly very relevant to the debate.
the independent adviser 
This appointment is optional, but is increasingly a feature of the larger scheme 
committees. The independent adviser is hired to attend a certain number of 
meetings per annum and to contribute to and/or write certain reports. The 
individual might also undertake the role of investment performance monitoring.
As with the role of the independent trustee on private sector trust boards, this 
can be a very influential appointment, but clearly this depends on the adviser’s 
expertise. We were told that it also depends on the extent to which the adviser is 
(or feels) able to challenge the committee and the investment consultant, since 
the committee has made the appointment, usually from a shortlist determined by 
the officers. We were also told that the most effective advisers are assertive and 
challenging, but that this could lead to the individual being fired if councillors 
and/or officers felt undermined due to their lack of knowledge and expertise – or 
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if they felt the independent adviser’s recommendations were not compatible with 
their own objectives as councillors and officers, for example (see 2.4 below).
the performance monitor
This role is undertaken by a range of third parties, which might or might not be 
directly involved with the committee. It might be the custodian, the independent 
adviser, the investment consultant, or it could be a specialist firm. The investment 
performance measurement service WM,12 for example, is widely used for macro-
level analysis and benchmarking, through its WM LGPS universe indices. 
non-councillor members
In many cases, a scheme member (usually a pensioner), a union representative, 
and a representative from one of the participating (non-local government) 
schemes are on the committee, but they do not appear to have voting rights.
shared roles
The shared role varies from scheme to scheme. Examples include where the 
pensions manager is also responsible for the administration of contributions 
and benefits, and where the scheme accountant, who might run the authority’s 
treasury function, reports to the committee on performance and also takes part in 
the manager selection.
the investment sub-committee
It is common practice in the private sector for the trust board of a large scheme 
to establish a sub-committee for investment, which comprises those members 
with the most experience and expertise, together with the professional advisers. 
Such sub-committees are not common among the London schemes, largely, we 
understand, due to time and resource issues. 
The purpose of the sub-committee is to make decisions on a range of issues, 
including asset allocation strategy at a macro level, tactical asset allocation, and 
de-risking, subject to the objectives set by the main committee. It also helps to 
establish clear benchmarks for the evaluation of asset manager performance 
through the analysis of, for example, risk-adjusted returns and tracking error, so 
that the main committee can understand better the reasons for under- and out-
performance. Without this type of strategic analysis and support, arguably there 
is no proper basis for the decision to hire and fire particular managers.
The sub-committee also focuses on the more technical aspects of investment 
strategy, such as rebalancing the portfolio and currency hedging.
Pensions’ management and administration
The administration of contributions and benefits usually is overseen by the 
pensions manager.
12 Owned by State Street
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Professional advisers to the committee
The number of professional advisers to the scheme varies, but the most important 
roles, in terms of investment governance, include:
•	 	The	actuary,	who	is	responsible	for	setting	the	key	assumptions	(the	nominal	
discount rate, the overall target investment return, and mortality assumptions, 
for example) on which the assets and liabilities are calculated and the funding 
level established
•	 	The	investment	consultant,	who	provides	advice	on	investment	strategy	and	the	
selection and appointment of the asset managers 
 °  Note: In all of the cases we have examined to date, the same organisation 
provides both actuarial and investment consultancy. However, further 
analysis might reveal exceptions to this arrangement.
•	 	The	custodian,	who	plays	an	important	role	in	reconciling	reports	from	
accountants and asset managers in relation to valuations
•	 	The	engagement	and	voting	consultant,	who	advises	the	scheme	on	
shareholder activism, which can be a significant feature of scheme governance
•	 	Legal	advice	tends	to	be	provided	by	the	authority’s	lawyers,	although	
independent firms are used for specific issues.
training
In the private sector, tPR requires a minimum level of training for all trustees 
through its Trustee Knowledge and Understanding (TKU) code of practice. 
Many boards, particularly of the larger schemes,  provide further training and 
require trustees to study for formal qualifications, for example, those offered by 
the Pensions Management Institute. It is relevant that tPR has raised concerns 
about the experience and expertise of trustees of smaller schemes and has 
recommended trustees should study for formal qualifications, such as the 
Pensions Management Institute’s Award in Pension Trusteeship.13
2.4 Potential weaknesses in the operation of the pension committee in 
practice
Good sustainable investment governance structures and processes are essential  
if schemes are to rise to the difficult challenges they face, which include:
•	 	The	sheer	number	and	complexity	of	scheme	risks,	and	the	need	to	identify	
and to manage or to mitigate these risks in a transparent manner. This 
information is summarised in the private sector in a ‘risk register’.14 
13  http://www.pensions-pmi.org.uk/qualifications-and-learning/award-in-pension-trusteeship-overview 
14 A risk register lists the key risks that could influence the outcome of running a pension scheme  
(or any other activity). For each risk, the register attempts to quantify the likelihood of the risk 
occurring and its likely impact if it does occur. The register also identifies who is responsible for  
each risk (the ‘risk owner’) and how it should be managed or mitigated. 
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•	 	The	extent	of	deficits
•	 	The	challenges	of	deficit	recovery	plans	and	periods
•	 	The	increasing	complexity	of	the	newer	(so-called	‘alternative’)	asset	classes,	
which can only be evaluated within the framework of a clear investment 
strategy that includes an explicit assumption for future investment returns 
•	 	The	negotiation	of	transparent	fees	for	service	providers,	including	the	actuary,	
investment consultant and asset managers
We found that some of the scheme pension committees appeared to be run in a 
very professional manner, comparable to the highest standards of DB trusteeship in 
the private sector. The best run committees generally have the following features:  
•	 	An	investment	sub-committee	that	focuses	on	investment	strategy	and	provides	
strategic direction to the main committee, which ensures a more robust basis 
for decision-making
•	 	In	a	minority	of	cases,	a	full-time	chief	investment	officer,	whose	role	is	to	
respond rapidly to market conditions and asset manager problems, and 
certainly much more promptly than is possible via the quarterly committee 
meetings. 
•	 	An	independent	adviser.		
•	 	Training	delivered	in	a	structured	format	and	using	independent	organisations.
However, certain pension committees appear to have weak governance 
structures, which make them particularly vulnerable to both behavioural 
influences and the democratic nature of councillors’ tenure. In some cases,  
we found evidence of frequent and wholesale changes in the committee 
memberships – for example, in one case the entire councillor membership 
changed at the last election. 
At the risk of over-simplification, smaller schemes tend to have fewer pension 
committee members and, for these schemes, there tends to be a considerable 
amount of ‘multi-tasking’, whereby one individual covers several functions. A 
typical example is where the authority’s accountant is the scheme accountant, runs 
the treasury function, reports on investment performance to the committee and 
is also involved with the manager selection. Moreover, we were told that smaller 
authorities are less able to provide the committee with secretariat support, which 
means that the members have to spend more time on this themselves.
Beyond these generic points, which are very much a symptom of scale, we 
identified certain specific issues that appear to affect the decisions committees 
make.
the local authority’s senior financial officers involved in running the fund 
appear to have conflicts of interest
In section 2.2 above, we said that the costs of running the fund are not fully 
transparent because significant overheads are shared by the fund and the 
authority, for example, in relation to the time spent on the fund by the chief 
finance officer and treasurer, among others. Two issues emerged from the 
interviews that gave rise to concerns.
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The first is that the pension fund might be used to cross-subsidise the authority’s 
other expenses, although interviewees varied in their estimates of the extent of 
this issue:
‘One reason authorities don’t want to lose control over the fund – as might happen if 
a central fund for London schemes was established – is that they lose their ability to 
cross-subsidise council and scheme expenses.’ councillor 
‘Of course, it is not the case that the authorities are drawing directly on the fund 
itself; it’s the fact that the overheads between the authority and the scheme are so 
blurred, it makes it easy to share costs in ways that cannot be scrutinised and which 
might not be appropriate.’ councillor
‘Overheads could be charged to the fund, rather than the employer, in an inequitable 
manner.’ treasurer
The second and possibly more significant concern relates to a potential conflict 
of interest faced by the authority’s professional financial officers. We report the 
following comments (which are just two examples of many we received along 
similar lines) and would stress that we did not have access to information about 
the typical remuneration arrangements for financial officers.15 
‘It’s usually the case that the remuneration of the authority’s top financial officers is 
linked to the size of the fund and their responsibilities for running it. This is why 
they are not going to hand their funds over to a central fund without a big fight.’ 
treasurer
‘I can see how senior finance officers’ salaries being linked to managing the pension 
fund would provide them with a very big incentive to prevent the schemes being 
managed centrally, especially at a time of public sector pay freezes.’ independent expert
committees comprise of councillors on ‘temporary contracts’ and with 
conflicting priorities
Councillors are elected every four years. This means that the councillor members 
of the committee might change on a regular basis, which undermines the 
continuity of the governance focus and the retention of collective expertise and 
knowledge. It also raises the concern that councillor members might have a 
political agenda that creates conflicts of interest in relation to running the scheme.
‘No successful business is steered by a series of temporary managers.’ independent expert
‘Scheme governance is a hostage to political fortune. It’s left to councillors, who might 
only serve for four years and who are aware that nobody really cares [about the 
funding position] because the liabilities are underwritten by the taxpayer.’  councillor
One interviewee identified what he called committee ‘member risk’ as the 
biggest concern for long-term governance:
15 In other words, we do not know whether finance officers in general receive a explicit bonus 
for taking on responsibility for the pension fund or whether they do this as part of their basic 
remuneration package.
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‘Councillor turn-over can lead to periods of inactivity, undermining the continuity of 
focus on investment issues. So there is a significant key member risk here.’ treasurer
Several interviewees said that councillors might lack interest in the scheme, as 
this was not a priority in relation to the purpose for which they felt they were 
elected:
 ‘Many councillors are reluctant pension committee members. It’s not what they 
were elected for and it’s not what they want to spend their time doing. You get votes 
for improving local services; there are no votes in running the pension scheme well.’ 
councillor
Lack of time, resources and expertise were also cited as major concerns:
‘For our scheme, the lack of resources is a real issue. Time is the first problem – the 
councillor members typically spend just 20 hours a year on the scheme and there 
might only be one or two officers [financial executives from the authority] involved. 
Also the budgets are tight for external advisors. Most of all, the knowledge and 
expertise of members and officers is the greatest challenge’. treasurer
training will not solve the governance problems
Interviewees said that the perceived weaknesses of the pension committee might 
be improved to an extent through better training, but that the very real limitations 
of training must be recognised:
‘In my experience it can be difficult training councillors. Some are reluctant to spend 
the time on this; others find it overloads them and makes them feel that they look 
ignorant’. independent expert
‘I’ve run training sessions where it looks like the councillors have turned up under 
duress. I don’t blame them – this was the last thing they thought they’d be doing 
when they were elected.’ independent expert
‘The training I’ve seen is borderline useless. It’s often left to the asset managers, who 
attend the quarterly meetings. This is a far from impartial source.’ independent expert
‘Even if the training is good, the councillors might change after the next election, so 
there’s no chance to build up real expertise. So, no, the committee can’t be fixed with 
more training. All you’ll end up with is better trained people facing the same conflicts 
of interest and the same short-term contracts. It needs root and branch reform to 
embed a robust and permanent governance structure.’ treasurer
Generic reporting where scheme-specific detail is needed 
The reporting of two of the most important features of the scheme – the 
investment strategy and the actuarial assumptions – tends to be poor and/or 
generic, suggesting this material might possibly be derived largely from CIPFA 
and DCLG guidance notes.  The same is true of funds’ coverage of the Myners 
Principles and socially responsible investment (SRI). In some cases, there is little 
or no correlation between the stated (generic) strategy and objectives, and the 
actual decisions made.
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‘If you look at the reports, you can see that they all say pretty much the same thing 
about the investment strategy and the actuarial assumptions. This doesn’t make any 
sense, given the very different funding positions of the schemes.’ treasurer
relationship with the actuarial and investment consultants and the asset 
managers
From our study of the minutes of meetings, it is evident that committees 
frequently focus on investment performance, rather than on investment strategy, 
and rely on the regular attendance of their asset managers for their ‘training’, 
which means that their understanding of investment issues is derived from a 
source that is not obviously impartial. Moreover, the quality of debate indicated 
in these minutes is very mixed, with members at times merely noting the content 
of the asset manager’s (often very complex) presentation and not challenging 
underperforming managers in a robust manner.
The underlying problem here is that in many cases there appears to be no clear 
focus on the investment objectives of the fund as a whole, which is a primary 
function of good investment governance. As we have already mentioned, many 
schemes do not even publish an assumption for the overall investment return 
target. Instead, both the committee meeting reports and the fund reports focus 
on the asset managers’ generic narratives of the economic climate and their 
performance relative to individual targets.
A significant number of committees do not have an investment sub-committee, 
which means that the councillors are directly responsible for all key investment 
decisions, often without appropriate resources to support them in their duties. 
From the committee meeting minutes, it appears that in many cases councillors, 
who might have little or no financial experience, expertise or training, are 
strongly influenced by their actuary and investment consultant and are less able 
to question investment strategy. 
This conclusion from our analysis of the minutes was strongly endorsed by our 
interviewees:
‘Due to the asymmetrical relationship in knowledge and expertise between the 
councillor members and their advisers, this leads to an over-reliance on the small 
number of investment consultants that dominate the sector.’ treasurer
Commenting on the knowledge and expertise of committee members in relation 
to investment governance, one interviewee was surprisingly critical:
‘There are two types of councillor member. The first has no financial background, 
which is bad. The second has some sort of financial background, which is worse. The 
latter tend to think they know all about money and exhibit an inappropriate level of 
confidence when they suddenly find themselves in charge of a multi-million pound 
fund.  councillor
But this interviewee was not the only one to suggest that councillors might 
unintentionally appear to behave in a naïve manner when placed in the position 
of being able to hire and fire asset managers:
‘There’s no doubt about it – councillors are much more interested in meeting  active 
asset managers and hearing them talk about their world. By comparison, passive 
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managers can appear to be dull with their emphasis on  a system that knocks a few 
basis points off the annual charge.’ councillor
Of course, this problem also arises in the private sector. A recent Towers Watson 
report noted the cost of ‘trigger happy’ fiduciaries, which builds on the earlier 
landmark study by Busse, Goyle and Wahal in 2010 in relation to asset manager 
turnover, which can result in high transition costs and lower performance, due 
to the tendency to fire underperforming active managers at the bottom of their 
performance cycle.16 With reference to the London schemes, an interviewee said:
‘If you look at some of the schemes that are very under-funded, you can see that 
they are trying to invest their way out: they are taking on increasing levels of risk 
and paying through the nose for specialist active asset managers, and then they keep 
changing them when they don’t like the performance.’ councillor
Apart from the transition costs, high manager turnover adds to the cost of 
updating the SIP:
‘Every time you change a manager you have to update the SIP – or at least you 
should do. This can be an expensive exercise in its own right, as it involves the 
lawyers and investment consultants.’ independent expert
Several interviewees questioned the advice of the investment consultants, who in 
theory should steer the committee away from the practices described above and 
towards better investment governance:
‘Councillors might not have an appropriate background in investment governance 
and do not have the time to undergo extensive training. This means that they pay 
inadequate attention to investment strategy and tend instead to focus on something 
that they think is more important – the hiring and firing of managers. If you look at 
how common this pattern is, it makes you wonder what the consultants are up to. If 
I were a cynic, I’d say the consultants were trying to justify their fees by encouraging 
manager turnover, so they can charge for the new manager selections and beauty 
parades.’ treasurer
‘Who reviews the consultants?’ independent expert
‘What governance process prompts smaller schemes to invest £50m in hedge funds, 
and the same amount in private equity and high-yield bonds? These are very 
specialist, research-intensive strategies that are high-risk and also very high-cost – plus 
the smaller the scheme the more you pay.’ councillor
‘The odd thing is that funds use sophisticated strategies in the wrong areas. They 
might invest in hedge funds and high-yield bonds, but then use index-linked gilts to 
hedge inflation risk, and conventional gilts to hedge interest-rate risk. Swaps would 
be a more efficient strategy, and they could also use infrastructure to deliver secure 
longer-term inflation-linked cash flows with the potential for a bit of capital return 
too.’ independent expert
16 www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/7259/TW-EU-2012-26094-The-cost-of-trigger-happy-
investing.pdf and  Jeffrey A. Busse, Amit Goyal, Sunil Wahal (2010) ‘Performance and Persistence 
in Institutional Investment Management’, Journal of Finance, 65(2): 765–790  (www.afajof.org/afa/
forthcoming/5143.pdf).
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‘The truth is, as a group of short-term financial fiduciaries, we are semi-illiterate and 
very easy to sell to.’ councillor
This last point was raised obliquely in the Hutton report, which suggested that 
there might be a lack of competition among consultants to the LGPS, which 
might lead to a degree of complacency:
 ‘At present there appears to be a concentration of knowledge of public service 
pensions, their legal basis and their management in a few specialists.’ [hutton 150] 
dependence on actuarial advisers
Interviewees expressed concern about the apparent ease with which decision-
makers can exploit what they called ‘actuarial arbitrage’, although they 
acknowledged that the implications of such practices might not be obvious to 
councillors:
‘The councillors’ priority is to keep the employer contribution down and to direct as 
many resources as possible to visible local causes. They might not appreciate the long-
term cost implications of using optimistic actuarial assumptions – their priority is to 
avoid having to go to the leader of the council to ask for more money for the pension 
fund at the expense of spending on local projects. That’s political suicide.’  
councillor
From our preliminary examination of the scheme documents, there does appear 
to be some evidence that actuaries choose assumptions that help the councillors 
keep down short-term funding costs. However, these  assumptions do not 
necessarily fit in with the long-term funding requirements of the scheme. This 
suggests that actuaries might be supporting a trend whereby schemes postpone 
the recognition of liabilities and costs into the future.
‘It’s hard to understand how two actuaries can recommend two different sets of 
assumptions for the same fund, but this is what happens in practice and it encourages 
committees to shop around for the best deal. They think they’ve got a bargain – but 
like a lot of bargains, it costs more in the long run.’ independent expert
There is also clear evidence that some schemes are not sticking to their recovery 
plan, with several recovery periods extended to the maximum permitted in the 
2010 valuation. This simply transfers costs into the future.
‘Some of these schemes are like doctors’ patients: they need to take strong medicine 
to get well. What’s the point of a recovery plan, if you keep on postponing the 
treatment? The prognosis can only get worse.’ independent expert
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section 3: Preliminary Quantitative Analysis
Building on the qualitative analysis of the previous section, in this section we 
briefly summarise the findings of our preliminary quantitative analysis of London 
LGPSs derived from the scheme valuations for 31 March 2010 (which in some 
cases include changes since 2007) and from external data sources, such as WM. 
We also provide comparisons with private sector defined benefit schemes. 
Our summary findings from the scheme valuations are as follows:
•	 Funding	levels	in	London	LGPSs:	60%	to	91%	with	an	average	of	75%.	
 ° Private sector average: 79.1%17
•	 	Employer	contributions	in	London	LGPSs:	15.8%	to	31.1%	with	an	average	of	
22.3%.
 ° Private sector: 13.7% to 19% with an average of 14.2%18 
•	 	Recovery	periods	in	London	LGPSs:	12	to	30	years	with	an	average	of	20.1	
years. 
 °  Private sector average: 9.4 years19 However, the current stance adopted 
by tPR indicates a more flexible approach, due to the post-2008 economic 
environment, which is expected to lead to longer recovery plans of 11 years 
on aggregate.20
•	 	Nominal	discount	rate	in	London	LGPSs:	5.6%	to	7.5%	with	an	average	of	
6.44%. 
 ° Private sector: 4.6% to 5.0% with an average of 4.8%.21
There were two key factors that were either not reported at all or were not 
reported on a systematic basis in the London LGPS documents:
•	 	The	assumptions	for	future	investment	returns,	which	are	provided	only	in	a	
minority of cases. The most common practice is to provide target investment 
returns for specific asset classes in relation to the managers appointed. This 
indicates poor governance in relation to investment strategy.
17 http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/Pages/PPF7800Index.aspx
18 ONS, Occupational Pension Schemes Survey Annual Report 2011, Chapter 4, Table 4.2, p.4:  
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_276117.pdf. Full report: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/
pensions/occupational-pension-scheme-survey-annual-report/2011-annual-report/index.html 
19 http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/recovery-plans-assumptions-triggers-2010.pdf 
20 See http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/the-defined-benefit-regime-evidence-and-
analysis.pdf and http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/pension-scheme-funding-in-the-
current-environment-statement-april-2012.pdf
21 Hymans Robertson, IAS 19 Assumptions Report, June 2012. The data are for 31 December 2011. 
http://www.hymans.co.uk/media/110665/ias19_assumptions_report_final.pdf 
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•	 	The	extent	of	funding	derived	from	council	tax	is	not	covered	in	the	publicly-
available documentation.
funding levels
Based on the 2010 valuations, we estimate that the average funding level for 
the London schemes is 75% with a range of 60% to 91%. This compares with the 
private sector, which had an average funding level of 79% in 2010 on a Pension 
Protection Fund (PPF) basis.22 
Funding levels for the private sector, on average, therefore, are higher than in the 
public sector. Moreover, the implications of the local government scheme funding 
positions are quite different from those in the private sector for several reasons:
•	 	As	mentioned	above,	the	costs	of	overheads	–	with	the	exception	of	fees	to	
external professionals – are implicit because the scheme is not separate from 
the authority, so certain costs are shared between the authority and scheme
•	 	Private	sector	sponsoring	employers	can	default,	in	which	case	the	scheme	
enters the PPF. This means that a key factor that determines a scheme’s risk 
rating and the recovery period is the strength of the employer covenant, the 
technical provisions basis used, the asset allocation, and the hedging strategy, 
among other factors. There is no employer covenant underlying the local 
government schemes: the burden of additional funding falls on the council  
tax payer.
•	 	Most	DB	schemes	in	the	private	sector	are	closed	to	new	members	and,	
increasingly, to future accrual. This has a major impact on the cash flows. 
Since the local government schemes are open, they benefit from a generally 
positive cash flow. 
In relation to the last point, the Audit Commission stated in its 2010 report, 
‘Local government pensions in England’, schemes cannot assume this positive 
cash flow will continue unchanged, due to the likelihood that there will be 
fewer employees contributing in future.23 Investment strategies, therefore, are 
vulnerable to a significant reduction in the proportion of active members, which 
could result in a negative cash flow.  ‘That would mean that pensions could not 
be paid without cashing in investments, which could reduce investment in long-
term growth assets.’ The research for the present report found that such risks 
were not well-addressed in the fund documents.
22 www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/Pages/PPF7800Index.aspx. The figure for 2012 is 82.3%. 
Note: a private sector scheme’s s179 liabilities represent, broadly speaking, the premium that would 
have to be paid to an insurance company to take on the payment of PPF levels of compensation. This 
compensation may be lower than full scheme benefits. For comparable data with the 2010 London 
scheme valuations see http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/DocumentLibrary/Documents/
PPF_7800_October_10.pdf. tPR announced in 2012 that it would permit certain schemes to extend 
their recovery periods, among other options, to avoid employers becoming insolvent in the current 
economic climate. See http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/the-defined-benefit-regime-
evidence-and-analysis.pdf and http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/pension-scheme-
funding-in-the-current-environment-statement-april-2012.pdf 
23 Audit Commission (2010), Local government pensions in England’ paragraph 43, www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/localgov/nationalstudies/localgovpensions/Pages/Default_copy.aspx    
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The Audit Commission also said that in addition to the impact of increasing 
longevity and falling investment returns – factors that affect private sector 
schemes too – the funding position of local government schemes would worsen 
because ‘unfunded liabilities are being deferred into the future, to make the 
scheme more affordable to employers in the short term’, and because of ‘the 
action needed to recover funding deficits’. In other words, there is a very real 
danger that some schemes will build up ever larger deficits, in effect accepting 
higher long-term costs in order to secure short-term affordability. Finally, the 
report notes that the significance of the scheme funding position is relevant to 
councils’ ability to fund local services and has an impact on council tax. Hutton 
raised similar concerns:
It is the funding valuations, not accounting data, which affect LGPS contribution 
rates and council tax. This means that, at present there is no independent and 
publicly available assessment of the likelihood of the LGPS in England and Wales 
eliminating its overall deficit over the long term and the consequences of not doing so. 
That overall deficit is in effect an unfunded liability. hutton 136
Employer contributions and recovery periods
There are two surprising differences between the London LGPSs and private 
sector schemes when it comes to employer contributions and recovery periods, 
and it is difficult to account for these in relation to the different legal frameworks. 
Employer contributions in the public sector are, on average, almost 50% higher 
than in the private sector schemes (22.3% vs 14.2%). However, recovery periods 
in the public sector schemes are more than double those in the private sector 
schemes (20.1 years v 9.4 years). 
This begs the question: if private sector schemes can eliminate their deficits 
over an average of 9 years (albeit likely to rise to 11 years from 2012) with an 
average employer contribution of 14%, why will it take the London schemes an 
average of 20 years with an average employer contribution of 22%, given that 
the ratio of deficits to assets are not vastly different? 
We also found clear evidence that some London schemes are simply extending 
their recovery period to the maximum at each valuation (so there is never any 
actual ‘recovery’). This is puzzling, unless the true liabilities in the public sector 
schemes are much higher than the reported liabilities. 
This brings us to the crucial question of the nominal discount rate used to 
determine the size of pension liabilities. 
nominal discount rate
The single most important variable that influences the current size of pension 
liabilities is the nominal discount rate that is applied to estimated future pension 
payments to give a current or present value to these future payments. The higher 
the rate at which these future payments are discounted, the lower is the present 
value of these liabilities.  In other words, a higher discount rate ‘lowers’ the 
pension liability and this effect is magnified as the discounting period increases.
The implications of changing the discount rate can be shown using a simple 
model for calculating pension fund liabilities.  Assume a typical UK male joins a 
defined benefit (DB) pension plan at age 25 and retires at 65.  Suppose his life 
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expectancy (LE) at age 65 is 19.74 years (which equals the LE of a typical UK 
male  at age 65 in 2012). 
Let:
•	 	L65	=	present	value	of	the	pension	liabilities	for	a	scheme	member	who	is	
currently aged 65 and has just retired (for each £1 payable per annum from 
age 65 for however long the pensioner lives)
•	 	L25	=	present	value	of	the	pension	liabilities	for	a	scheme	member	who	is	
currently aged 25 (and expects to receive a full pension from the scheme when 
he is 65)
•	 	LE	=	19.74	=	Life	expectancy	of	a	typical	UK	male	at	age	65	in	2012
•	 	R	=	discount	rate
•	 	(1	+	R)-40		=	1÷	(1	+	R)40		=	40-year	discount	factor	when	the	discount	rate	
is R. By multiplying the present value of the liability at age 65 by this discount 
factor, we get the present value of the liability at age 25 (40 years earlier)
Given the above, the present value of the pension liabilities for the 65-year old is 
equal to the present value of an annuity paying £1 per annum for LE years using 
a discount rate of R:24
L65	=	[1	–	(1	+	R)-LE]÷R
and the present value of the pension liabilities for the 25-year old is the present 
value of the pension liabilities for the 65-year old discounted for 40 years:
L25	=	L65	x	(1	+	R)-40
LGPS assumptions for the discount rate vary between 2.6% and 4.5% above 
the assumed inflation rate (which we take to be 3%) implying that the nominal 
discount rate varies between 5.6% and 7.5%.  Table 1 below shows the impact 
on the value of pension liabilities at age 65 and 25 of varying the discount rate 
within this range.
24  See Equation (3.26) on p. 97 of David Blake (2000) ‘Financial Market Analysis’ published by 
Wiley. 
table 1: the impact of the discount rate on the value of pension liabilities: 
A comparison between the highest and lowest discount rate used in the 
london lGPss (£ per £1p.a. pension from age 65 for life)
liabilities discount rate
5.6% (lowest London LGPS) 7.5% (highest London LGPS)
Liabilities at 65 (L65) 11.77 10.13
% reduction at 7.5% cf 5.6% - -13.86%
Liabilities at 25 (L25) 1.33 0.56
% reduction at 7.5% cf 5.6% - -57.79%
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A discount rate of 7.5% is 34% higher than a discount rate of 5.6%. At age 65, 
a discount rate of 7.5% ‘reduces’ the present value of pension liabilities (payable 
from age 65) by nearly 14% compared with a discount rate of 5.6%. However, 
the real impact of the discount rate lies in discounting from age 65 to the current 
age of 25. The impact of the higher discount rate is to ‘reduce’ liabilities at age 
25 by 58%.  So for a 40-year discounting period, the magnification effect is 
almost twice the size of the change in the discount rate.
 
Table 2 shows the comparison between the average private sector discount rate  
(of 4.8%) and the average London LGPS discount rate (of 6.44%). There are  
similar sized differences between the present values of the pension liabilities 
between the two sectors as there was between the London LGPSs that had the 
lowest and highest discount rates (see Table 1). The liabilities of the average 
London LGPS would be substantially higher if it used the average private sector 
discount rate. This might go some way to explain the puzzle discussed earlier.  
The liabilities of the average London LGPS are probably much higher than the 
reported figures suggest.
investment risk exposure
Figure 1 shows that local government (LG) and private sector (PS) funds had 
similar weightings in risk assets (i.e., equities) prior to 2005, at around 70%. 
After 2005, a very significant gap has emerged. PS funds have de-risked steadily: 
by the start of 2012, total risk assets had fallen to 35%. By contrast, LG funds 
were still holding more than 60% of their investments in risk assets.25 This would 
appear to support the view of the councillor who informed us that schemes were 
taking on ‘increasing levels of risk’ in an attempt to remove their deficit. Figure 2 
shows that LG funds have a (slightly) higher percentage of assets that are actively 
managed than PS funds.  
25 We understand that CIPFA data indicate that the average equity weighting for all local government 
funds is 65%. Our initial analysis confirms this figure although it is not always apparent whether 
‘other’ asset classes listed by funds relate to equity-like assets or bond-like assets, therefore further 
analysis is required to provide more accurate scheme-specific weightings.
table 2: the impact of the discount rate on the value of pension liabilities: 
A comparison between the average discount rate used in the private  
sector and in the london lGPss  (£ per £1p.a. pension from age 65 for life)
liabilities discount rate
4.8% 
(average in private sector)
6.44% 
(average in London LGPS)
Liabilities at 65 (L65) 12.58 11.00
% reduction at 6.44% cf 4.8% - -12.55%
Liabilities at 25 (L25) 1.93 0.91
% reduction at 6.44% cf 4.8% - -53.01%
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Figure 3 shows that this additional risk taking by LG funds has not been 
rewarded. The total cumulative return generated by LG funds of 55% between 
2005 and 2012 lags behind the 64% generated by PS funds. 
Figure 1: Equity weighting (%) in local government and private sector pension 
schemes 2002-12 source: state street investment Analytics
Figure 2: Active management (% of total assets) in local government and private 
sector pension schemes 2002-12 source: state street investment Analytics
An Evaluation of Investment Governance in London Local Government Pension Schemes 3
Figure 3: Cumulative return in local government and private sector pension 
schemes 2002-12 source: state street investment Analytics
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section 4: Proposals for further research
Hutton recommended a two-stage approach, with which we agree, but we 
suggest the addition of a requirement for transparent comparable data should 
be the first priority. Our recommendations for further research, therefore, are: 
1.  To establish a blueprint for the calculation and explicit presentation of clear 
and consistent data.  
2.  To establish a clear definition of investment governance for the London 
schemes
3.  Based on the data blueprint and the definition of investment governance, 
to conduct a full benchmarking study of the 34 funds to produce a ‘map’ of 
governance standards across all the schemes.
We offer the following observations as a basis for debate on these three 
proposals.
4.1 Data requirements
For the funded LGPS, it is arguably easier to assess whether the pension benefits 
promised are sustainable by considering whether the liabilities built up to date are 
being fully covered by the assets held by the Funds and any deficit recovery plans 
approved by the Fund. Relevant information on assets, liabilities and deficits for 
individual LGPS Funds is generated by triennial actuarial funding valuations. 
However, this information is not available at an aggregate national level. hutton 17
To facilitate closer scrutiny and comparisons, therefore, there needs to be 
an agreed set of data requirements and the data should be calculated in a 
consistent manner that is set out explicitly in all documentation. We wonder if a 
single standard for disclosure might be derived from the requirements stipulated 
by tPR and the Pension Protection fund (PPF) for private sector schemes.
A simple tabulated summary at the beginning of each annual report might 
include the following data for the current and previous two valuations:
•	 	Assets	and	liabilities	and	how	these	are	measured
•	 	The	size	of	the	fund	and	deficit
•	 	The	funding	position
•	 	The	recovery	period
•	 	The	actuarial	assumptions	
 ° Nominal discount rate 
 ° Future investment performance
 ° Inflation (earnings and price)
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•	 	Mortality
•	 	Asset	manager	turnover,	fees	and	transition	costs
•	 	The	employer	contribution
•	 	The	proportion	of	council	tax	receipts	used	for	scheme	funding	purposes
This summary could be submitted to a central body, so that it can be 
consolidated in a single document and made available on a central website.
4.2 Definition of good investment governance
There is a powerful case for more independent oversight and much stronger governance 
of all the public service pension schemes. This should keep government, taxpayers and 
scheme members better informed about the financial health of these schemes. hutton 4
This section explores the crucial issue of what is meant by good investment 
governance for the London schemes (see below for full details). 
The objective of this stage of the proposed research is to construct a clear 
benchmark against which the pension schemes can be measured and evaluated, 
individually and in aggregate.
For investment governance to be effective, it must be embedded in the pension 
committee’s decision-making processes. It is also very important to preserve the 
collective long-term experience, expertise and knowledge of committee members, 
insofar as this is possible, as the tenure of councillor members is vulnerable and 
subject to change every four years when local elections are held.
Recommendation 17: Every public service pension scheme (and individual LGPS 
Fund) should have a properly constituted, trained and competent Pension Board, with 
member nominees, responsible for meeting good standards of governance including 
effective and efficient administration. There should also be a pension policy group for 
each scheme at national level for considering major changes to scheme rules. 
hutton 126
The role of national pensions boards in respect of the locally administered schemes 
would be facilitative. While not taking on a regulatory or oversight role national 
pensions boards might help analyse and recommend on comparative performance of 
governance and administration. They might point to the scope for efficiencies in those 
areas that raise standards across the piece. In the case of the LGPS, their national 
pensions board could also look at overall funding and the comparative performance 
of individual Funds, fostering links between different individual LGPS Funds and 
perhaps making recommendations on opportunities to capture efficiencies and to 
improve investment performance. The boards could include nominees of individual 
scheme members and employers as well as those responsible for national scheme rules 
and local financing. hutton 131
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Factors that shape the model for investment governance include:
1. Common standards for reporting key data 
2.  Regulation (comparison of the London schemes’ statutory framework with 
private sector DB regulation, which is overseen by tPR)
3. Investment governance objectives, including:
 a. Fiduciary responsibilities
 b. Accountability
 c. Transparency
 d.  Risk management and the introduction of risk registers, which are used in 
private sector DB schemes to summarise the key risks for the scheme and 
the controls put in place to manage and mitigate these risks.
 e.  Variations between schemes: why these might exist and the need to impose 
quantitative limits 
4. The composition of the governance committee
 a. Representation of stakeholders and experts
 b. Continuity /turnover / succession planning
 c. Levels of experience and expertise
 d.  Relevant qualifications and requirement as condition of membership (e.g., 
the equivalent of TKU for local government schemes). 
 e. Type of external professionals used
 f. Frequency of meetings; time allocation to investment issues
 g. Identification of and processes to deal with potential conflicts of interest
5. Investment strategy 
 a. Role of the investment sub-committee
 b. How to achieve consistency in structure and processes across all schemes
6. Asset management
 a. Frequency of strategy review and process
 b. Cost base / control 
 c. Fee structures: explicit and implicit
 d. Risk management
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 e. Role of the investment consultant
 f. Asset management procurement methodologies 
 g. Performance measurement
 h. ESG
independent regulation and oversight
Schemes are not subject to external independent regulation in the way that private 
sector schemes are. hutton 16
By comparison with the private sector, the London schemes present very detailed 
accounting information, but very limited auditing of investment governance. 
The Hutton report acknowledged the unusual status of LGPSs, which, unlike 
private sector schemes, are connected with the local democratic process. 
The report said that ‘where schemes with nationally determined rules are 
administered locally, as is the case for the LGPS … there is a case for 
supplementing local pension boards with a national pension board … separate 
from the individual local authorities and employers’. [130] 
Recommendation 19: Governance and the availability and transparency of 
information would be improved by government establishing a framework that ensures 
independent oversight of the governance, administration and data transparency of 
public service pension schemes. Government should consider which body or bodies, 
including, for example, The Pensions Regulator, is most suitable to undertake this 
role. hutton 16
We suggest that while the Pensions Regulator might be the obvious choice for 
an independent regulator for the local government schemes, tPR would require 
considerable additional resources to undertake this role. This is particularly 
relevant as tPR is required to oversee the defined contribution (DC) schemes 
of private sector employers used for auto-enrolment, which is being phased in 
between 2012 and 2018.
4.3 The benchmarking survey 
Recommendation 17: Every public service pension scheme (and individual LGPS 
Fund) should have a properly constituted, trained and competent Pension Board, with 
member nominees, responsible for meeting good standards of governance including 
effective and efficient administration. There should also be a pension policy group for 
each scheme at national level for considering major changes to scheme rules.  
hutton 16
Our research indicates that investment governance in the public sector is more 
lightly monitored or audited than is the case in the private sector, where such 
governance is considered a high priority by tPR. Many local government schemes 
appear just to ‘tick the box’ when it comes to publishing their (rather generic) 
Statement of Investment Principles. By contrast, the reverse is true in relation to 
pension fund accounting, which is rigorously audited in the public sector – more 
so, we were told, than in the private sector.
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We recommend the following data should be collected for the last three valuation 
periods, updated with further information from other documents, such as the 
annual report and accounts and the custodian’s report. This would provide a 
data set that facilitates the analysis of aggregate and scheme-specific trends in 
relation, for example to increased contributions, improvements in investment 
performance, reduction in costs, significant changes in the membership number 
and profile.
data to be collected 
1. AUM
2. Liabilities 
 a. In aggregate
 b. Relative to active, deferred and pensioner member sections
3. The funding level
4. The recovery plan period 
5. Actuarial assumptions
 a. Nominal discount rate 
 b. Future investment performance
 c. Inflation (earnings and prices)
 d. Mortality
e. Early retirement strain assumptions
6. Investment strategy
 a. Asset allocation and rationale
 b. Use of active and passive managers
 c. Performance relative to an objective benchmark
 d. Number of managers used
 e. Turnover of both portfolio and managers
7. Fees paid to:
 a. The investment consultant
 b. The actuary
 c. The asset managers, including transition fees when the managers change
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8. The employer contribution
9. The proportion of council tax receipts used for scheme funding purposes
10. The composition of the pension committee
 a. Number of councillor members 
 b. Average number of years of service on the committee
 c. Turnover and reasons
 d. Total hours per annum members spent on
  i. Scheme meetings
  ii. Other fund-related duties 
 e. Structure of the investment sub-committee
 f. Analysis of the role of the S151 officer 
 g.  Analysis of the role of the CIO and the independent adviser, where 
application
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conclusion
This report sheds a new light on the London Local Government Pension Schemes 
in relation to their published data and to their investment governance framework 
and processes. We hope that it helps all stakeholders in the London schemes 
to understand better the very real difficulties those tasked with running these 
schemes face, and also to appreciate the complexity of the potential conflicts of 
interest that appear to exist, which, although understandable, might influence 
key decisions made about the deferment of liabilities into the future and the 
responses to reform. 
As we note in the Preface, the London LGPSs in aggregate represent a ticking 
time-bomb for London council tax payers and very likely for national tax payers 
too. But, we believe it is possible for this time bomb to be diffused if the relevant 
stakeholders act now. The lessons learned from the governance failings in 
private sector DB schemes in the 1990s, which led to their widespread closure 
at the turn of the century, must not be lost. Ultimately, governance is a matter 
for the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), but the 
cooperation of all stakeholders is a prerequisite for successful reform. 
We recognise the sensitivity of the debate about reform, which is why we suggest 
that a full benchmarking study based on an agreed definition of investment 
governance – as recommended by the Hutton report – is required. This study 
must be impartial and must accommodate the views of all stakeholders willing to 
engage with the research. 
We welcome responses to this report. 
Please contact David Blake d.blake@city.ac.uk 
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About the Pensions institute
The objectives of the Pensions Institute are:
•	 	to	undertake	high	quality	research	in	all	fields	related	to	pensions
•	 	to	communicate	the	results	of	that	research	to	the	academic	and	practitioner	
community
•	 	to	establish	an	international	network	of	pensions	researchers	from	a	variety	
of disciplines
•	 t	o	provide	expert	independent	advice	to	the	pensions	industry	and	
government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time disciplines such as 
economics, finance, insurance, and actuarial science through to accounting, 
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order 
to enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions. As the first and 
only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, the Pensions 
Institute unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields in order to 
offer an integrated approach to the complex problems that arise in this field. The 
Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
Pension microeconomics
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, long term savings 
and retirement decisions.
Pension fund management and performance
The investment management and investment performance of occupational and 
personal pension schemes.
Pension funding and valuations
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities, 
and guarantees.
Pension law and regulation
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management.
Pension accounting, taxation and administration
The operational aspects of running pension schemes.
marketing
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products.
macroeconomics of pensions
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size and 
maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy (e.g. corporate, 
public and international sectors).
Public policy
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision and other employee 
benefits in the light of factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty 
and the demographic developments in Europe and other countries. 
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy 
but the Pensions Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. For more 
details, see: pensions-institute.org
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